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 By the time that this review is published I will have passed my 64th 
birthday.  I have spent more than half of my adult life attempting to 
understand and live my life according to daojia – philosophical Daoism.  
"The Moral Fool" appears to be the book I have been awaiting for more than 
three decades.
 Hans-Georg Moeller has taken a decidedly daojia stance on the 
question and the concerns of morality.  For a Daoist sage, morality is at best 
not needed and at worst highly dangerous.  Moeller explores these ideas in 
depth and with wonderful ability.  My aim is to become more of a fool than I 
already am.
 Typically, from a daojia position, Moeller does not define the moral 
fool.  Let me describe, in Moeller's words, the moral fool:
• "is not a fundamentalist" (p.5)
• "simply does not understand why ethics are necessarily good" (p.
5)
• "this does not mean that he is entirely without ethical 
judgements" (p.5)
• "…is someone who does not really see any basis for coming up 
with moral principles" (p.14)
• "he does not understand on what grounds the absolute distinction 
between good and evil can be founded" (p.15)
• "he does not have great human aspirations and, consequently, 
does not fail in a grandiose way" (p.15)
• "he is not really interested in the glory of failure – he is not 
interested in glory, at all" (p.15)
• "The moral fool is unwilling to look at the world on the basis of 
ethical distinctions since he does not accept their validity"
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Having described the characteristics of the moral fool, Moeller then 
asks the question, "Is it good to be good?".  He then assesses the 
problems of assigning moral value to actions and positions.  Following 
this he examines the negative ethics of Hans Saner:
 "1. a radical renunciation of morality as a result of, for 
instance, a disgust with ethics and its failures,
  2. a normative ethics that assumes that the good as such 
cannot be determined and that is therefore can only be 
explained negatively—analogous to the attempts of 
negative theology to define God,
  3. a skeptical approach toward ethics that assumes that no 
general ethical guidelines or principles can be established 
since morality is always concrete and embedded in 
particular situations, and
  4. an ethics that does not believe in the primacy of action but 
rather in the primacy of refraining from interventions—and 
that thus advocates an ethics of 'letting-be'".
This is followed by a discussion of Daojia morality à la the Laozi and 
the Zhuangzi which Moeller suggests is closest to Saner's first 
proposition.
 Part 2 of "The Moral Fool" examines what Moeller entitles 'The 
Pathology of Ethics' in areas such as Anger, Aesthetics and Progress.  
In each case he juxtaposes the characteristics of the Moral Fool to that 
of the normal Western social paradigm – both liberal and conservative.
 Part 3 of the book is entitled 'Ethics in Contemporary Society' 
and Moeller again contrasts the processes of the Moral Fool with 
contemporary ideas in "morality and law, civil rights, the death 
penalty, war and mass media.  Each of these chapters looks, in depth, 
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at the characteristics of modern moral arguments and the responses 
of a moral fool.  In many instances, I was forced into deep 
introspection of my own views.  This introspection lead to 
fundamental evaluation and re-interpretation of my own positions.
 In his conclusion, 'Applied Amorality' Moeller states that as a 
result of mass media and especially virtual or viral media, "morality 
is…a type of communication rather than something that is inherent in 
individuals or actions…".  "There is no single or generally accepted 
moral paradigm."
 The election of Barack Obama, the global financial crisis and its 
aftermath and the vitriolic confrontations about health reform in the 
U.S. confirm these ideas.  The simplicity of fundamental principles has 
replaced reflective consideration of complex problems.  As Moeller 
states, "Morality is a form of communicative decomplexification."
 Moeller's work, for me, suggests concerted re-evaluation and 
perhaps re-formulation of The Platform Principles of ecosophy, with a 
view to removing the inherent morality imbued within them.  The old 
arguments of rights and values which inform Western societies are 
often twisted into grotesque configurations.  Witness, one year later, 
the right of Wall Street firms to grant massive bonuses based on the 
supposed value of the individuals to whom they are awarded.
 The only short-coming, in my opinion,  of "The Moral Fool" is 
that Moeller does not show us how to become moral fools.  Perhaps 
that will be the subject of his next book.  However, I, serendipitously, 
know how to become a moral fool.
 In their book, "Dao De Jing", Ames and Hall (2003, Ballantine 
Books) comment upon and list what they refer to as the Wu-forms and 
what I have come to call the Wu-processes.  For Ames and Hall the 
wu-form "…is the the 'substance' and 'fruit' – the passionate 
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experience of life itself – rather than a catechism of bloodless ethical 
principles, that is the real site of knowing."   The wu-forms are:
Wu-ming – to be non-interfering in going about your business.
Wu-wei – non-coercive action.
Wu-xin – unmediated thinking and feeling.
Wu-yu – objectless desire.
Wu-zheng – striving without contentiousness.
Wu-zhi – unprincipled knowing.
Those who learn to embody the process skills implied by the wu-
forms are moral fools.  This, of course, means changing behavioural 
habits.  The social habits of confrontation (attitude, in general 
parlance), interference with others, coercion by law or advertising, 
thinking mediated by others (advertising, religion, etc.), desire and 
greed (unlimited purchasing) and reliance on so-called fundamental 
truth (Christian, Muslim, Hindu, etc.) lead to moral and ethical 
confrontation daily.  Such habits are, apparently, mal-adaptive since in 
their more extreme forms they justify and demand killing and slavery, 
among other ideas.
 The wu-forms, when embodied as ways of being, become 
adaptive habits.  As habits, they are known from the gut and modulate 
the behaviour of the moral fool.
 If I could, I would make Hans-Georg Moeller's "The Moral Fool" 
mandatory reading for every person who logs on to The Trumpeter.
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